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THE WARREN COURT AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
A. Kenneth Pye• 
ON October 5, 1953, Earl Warren became Chief Justice of the United States. During the fifteen years of his tenure as Chief 
Justice, fundamental changes in criminal procedure have resulted· 
from decisions of what is popularly called "the Warren Court." 
There may be a legitimate difference of opinion whether these 
changes constitute a "criminal law revolution" or merely an orderly 
evolution toward the application of civilized standards to the trial 
of persons accused of crime. Whatever the characterization, however, 
there can be little doubt that the developments of the past fifteen 
years have unalterably changed the course of .the administration of 
criminal justice in America. 
In 1953, a state criminal trial in the United States differed little 
from its predecessor of fifty or even a hundred years. The accused 
in theory was cloaked ·with a panoply of constitutional rights. Most 
unsophisticated observers would have concluded from reading the 
Bill of Rights that a criminal defendant was protected against an 
unlawful arrest or an unlawful search and seizure by the fourth 
amendment; that he was assured the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion by the fifth amendment; and that rights to the assistance of 
counsel in his own defense, a prompt and speedy trial by common-
law jury, compulsory process _for witnesses, and the right to confront 
witnesses against him were guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 
Furthermore, the eighth amendment's prohibition of excessive bail 
seemed to reflect a policy against pretrial incarceration. In addition, 
the constitutional rights ·of an accused were complemented by other 
statutes and rules such as those which provided that after arrest a 
suspect should be brought promptly before a judicial officer.1 
There were few outcries from the police that they were being 
• Dean, School of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1951, State University of New York 
at Buffalo; LL.B. 1953, LL.M., 1955, Georgetown University.-Ed. 
I. The most common type of statute requires that a person anested without a 
warrant be brought before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." E.g., ARIZ. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-1418 (1956); PA. Ruu-s OF CRIM. PROC. § 116(a) (1965). Others use 
language such as "forthwith" [WYO. STAT. Ax:-.. § 7-12 (1957)], or "without delay" [ORE. 
REV. STAT. § 133.550 (1963)]. Some have specific time limits. E.g.. Mo. REv. STAT. 
§ 544.170 (1959) ("20 l1ours''); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-212 (Supp. 1967) ("without delay" 
and not later than 48 hours). Fourteen states have no general provisions. The authori-
ties dealing with the effect of a violation of a statute upon the admissibility of a 
statement are collected in Annot., Admissibility of Confessions as Affected by Delay in 
hraignment of Prisoner, 19 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951). 
[249] 
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handcuffed, and our criminal courts were not afflicted by docket 
delay. A high percentage of defendants chose to confess, and an even 
greater number cooperated with the system by pleading guilty. In 
the eyes of most Americans, ours was a system of criminal justice 
unusually responsive to the individual rights of persons accused of 
crime. Indeed, as able a jurist as Learned Hand cautioned that our 
danger did not lie in too little tenderness to the accused, but in 
"watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution 
of crime."2 
A lawyer called upon to defend a person charged with crime 
might have viewed the situation a little differently. A typical 
robbery trial of fifteen years ago had the great advantage of brevity. 
The victim would testify that from a fleeting glance she could now 
identify the young Negro who had snatched her purse at night 
while she stood waiting for a bus. If defense counsel cross-examined 
her on the issue of identity, the prosecutor would be permitted to 
rehabilitate the witness by proof of a prior identification in a lineup, 
which might or might not have been staged. A police officer would 
then testify that the defendant voluntarily confessed to the offense 
when confronted with the identification and that this confession was 
obtained without using any unlawful threats, inducements, or third-
degree methods. 
Cross-examination might reveal that the defendant was a young 
unemployed Negro of limited education, who had been arrested 
without probable cause, had been detained in violation of a state 
statute which required prompt presentment before a magistrate, had 
not received the assistance of counsel at these preliminary stages, and 
had not been informed of his right to remain silent. If the accused 
chose to testify on the issue of voluntariness of'the confession, there 
might be substantial conflicting testimony concerning the length of 
confinement before the statement was obtained and the course of 
events in the interrogation room. If the defendant denied that he 
made any inculpatory statement, the prosecutor would call other 
police officers who would corroborate each other's testimony. The 
defendant's testimony would then stand by itself, unless his counsel 
could develop inconsistencies in the police stories through cross-
examination. A brief argument would ensue on the question of 
voluntariness, after which the judge would normally resolve the 
issue of credibility against the accused and admit the confession; on 
2. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 64g (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
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occasion, he might submit it to the jury for its determination of 
voluntariness.3 
In some cases, the state might be able to offer evidence that an 
item belonging to the victim was found on the defendant's person 
after he was arrested. Proof by the defendant that the arrest which 
preceded the search was unlawful would be deemed irrelevant in 
many states.4 Even in a jurisdiction that would exclude evidence 
obtained as a result of an unlawful search, the defendant might have 
to play Russian roulette by admitting possession in order to have 
the necessary standing to move to suppress. 5 It was of no crucial 
legal significance that the defendant had not received counsel until 
the eve of the trial; that he had been incarcerated for a considerable 
period before trial because bail had been set at a figure well beyond 
his financial capacity to meet, despite the unlikelihood that he 
would flee the jurisdiction; or that he had been denied access to 
prior statements of the crucial government witnesses against him. 
Indeed, our mythical defendant would be considered fortunate to 
have a Ia-wyer to represent him at trial, a privilege not guaranteed to 
defendants in over one quarter of the states.6 
When the prosecution rested, the defendant could testify in his 
own defense, except in Georgia.7 If he did, he could anticipate 
cross-examination based on prior convictions; in many states such 
cross-examination was not restricted to convictions having anything 
to do with credibility.8 If the defendant declined to testify, in some 
states he would have to expect the prosecutor to comment on this 
fact.9 If he chose to admit character evidence, he might find that the 
prosecutor would bring before the jury specific instances of his prior 
bad acts, or even arrests for ·which he had not been tried, through 
adroit cross-examinatiOIJ~10 The defendant would usually be forced 
to rely upon friends or close members of his family for corroboration 
of his testimony, since disinterested third parties might well have dis-
3. E.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1963). 
4. The authorities are collected in the appendix to the opinion of the Court in 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960). 
5. The standing cases are discussed in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
6. Before Gideon, five states refused to provide counsel even when it was requested 
by the defendant. Eight other states provided counsel only when requested. Van 
Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 
74 YAU: L.J. 606 (1965). 
7. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
8. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 42, 43, 158 (1954); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988 
(3d ed. 1940). 
9. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); 8 J. W1GMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272 (3d ed. 
1940). 
10. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). 
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appeared during the period of incarceration between arrest and the 
time after.indictment when counsel was appointed.11 Rarely would 
the assertion of an alibi defense by a sister or mother be given much 
credence by a jury. If a defendant wished to appeal, he might find 
that his inability to pay the costs barred his path to review,12 or that, 
if review were permitted, no adequate provisions existed to furnish 
him with a lawyer to brief and argue his case.13 Superimposed over 
the whole system was the principle of "differential leniency"; a de-
fendant who pleaded guilty and saved the state the cost of a trial 
could reasonably anticipate a much lighter sentence than a defen-
dant who chose to assert his constitutional right to an adjudication 
of his guilt or innocence before a jury.14 
The broad theoretical framework of criminal justice under the 
Bill of Rights made it relatively easy to assert that our system is 
based on the premise that it is better to let one hundred guilty men 
go free than to convict one innocent man. Few innocent men were 
in fact convicted, but it is doubtful whether this was primarily be-
cause of the protections provided to an accused, or whether it was 
the result of the efficient screening of cases before trial by prose-
cutors and the peculiarly American institution of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. Indeed, the effectiveness of the criminal process, if judged 
in terms of conviction rates, was apt to be misleading unless modified 
by the realization that a high percentage of crimes were not re-
ported; that a high percentage of reported crimes were not solved; 
that prosecution was declined or charges were reduced in a high 
percentage of solved crimes; that a substantial percentage of those 
convicted would be placed on probation without adequate super-
vision; and that a substantial percentage of those sentenced to 
11. The disadvantages resulting from the late appointment of counsel are discussed 
in Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863, 870-71 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
12. Even when a statute permitted an indigent to appeal in forma pauperis, he 
might be met with a standard of frivolity quite different from that used in prepaid 
appeals. A classic case is Kemp v. United States, 311 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1962), where 
an indigent was required to go to the Supreme Court in order to obtain leave to appeal 
[369 U.S. 661 (1962)] and then obtained a per curiam reversal of his conviction on the 
grounds of insufficiency of the evidence when his case was heard on the merits by the 
court of appeals, which had denied him leave to appeal. 
13. The effects of not having counsel are described in Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353 (1963). .. . 
14. In a recent project of the American Bar Associition concerning pleas of guilty, 
it was assumed that "conviction without trial will and should continue to be a most 
frequent means for the disposition of criminal cases," and that the existing plea-
bargaining system which produces a high percentage of guilty pleas "cannot operate 
effectively unless trial judges in fact grant charge and sentence concessions to most 
defendants who enter a plea.of guilty or nolo contendere." AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION, 
AME.RICAN BAR AssOCIATION PROJEcr ON MiNIMAL STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
STANDARDS RELATiNG TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2, 38 (1967). 
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imprisonment would be released before expiration of their full 
term without having had the benefit of any effective program of 
rehabilitation. 
Perhaps more important was the disparity between the reality of 
the criminal process and the ideals of civilized conduct to which we 
as a nation had sworn allegiance. Despite the preferred values re-
flected in the Bill of Rights, the criminal trial was viewed solely as a 
truth-seeking process in which no other social values were deemed 
more significant than the determination of whether or not a par-
ticular defendant had committed the crime for which he was 
charged.115 Protection of the rights of citizens who were not before 
the court was not deemed to be a function of the criminal process. 
Few would have suggested that it was consistent with the American 
ideal for police to engage routinely in "investigative arrests" without 
probable cause,16 to search without warrants, or to engage in pro-
longed incommunicado interrogations in violation of prompt pre-
sentment statutes. Even fewer thought it was fair to try a defendant 
for a felony without a lawyer or deny him an appeal if he was poor. 
However, these were thought to be matters of local concern for 
which redress should be sought by civil suits, by better internal con-
trols within police departments, or by appeals to state legislatures 
and state courts. The fact that the problems were most serious where 
the antagonism to change was the greatest was thought to be part of 
the cost we were required to pay for federalism. 
In 1953, it would not have been unreasonable for a citizen to 
have asked himself: ""Which of my rights are really important? To 
what extent does the Constitution limit the police in doing what 
they want to do in their efforts to solve crime? How would I be 
treated differently if the -Bill of Rights were repealed?" 
After fifteen years of decisions of the Warren Court, we can 
15. See, e.g., the argument against using the rules of evidence to deter police mis-
conduct that was advanced by Justice Traynor in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 
442-43, .282 P .2d 905, 910 (1955): 
The rules of evidence are designed to enable courts to reach the truth and, in 
criminal cases, to secure a fair trial to those accused of crime. Evidence obtained 
by an illegal search and seizure is ordinarily just as true and reliable as evidence 
lawfully obtained. The court needs all reliable evidence material to the issue 
before it, the guilt or innocence of the accused, and how such evidence is obtained 
is immaterial to that issue. It should not be excluded unless strong considerations 
of public policy demand it. There are no such considerations. 
16. The widespread use of the practice in Washington, D.C., was documented in the 
HORSKY REPORT [REPORT AND REcoMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSIONERS' Co:MMITTEE ON 
PouCE ARRESTS FOR INVESTIGATION (1962)]. See Kamisar, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REv. 
1502 (1963). See also Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 16 
(1957); LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current 
Practices, 1962 WASH. U. L.Q. 331. 
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answer these questions with some confidence and considerable pride. 
The gulf between the illusion and reality of constitutional protection 
has been narrowed. The quality of justice meted out to the poor 
more closely approximates that available to the rich. In many areas 
we are beginning to implement rights to which we have paid lip 
service for decades. We have begun to remove much of the hypocrisy 
which characterized our criminal process. While perhaps not totally 
effective,17 court decisions do restrain police from some unlawful 
practices which were previously regarded as routine. A defendant is 
assured most of the basic procedural rights whether he is tried in a 
state or a federal court. There has been a renaissance of interest in 
the administration of criminal justice in legislative chambers; this 
interest is reflected in such legislation as the Criminal Justice Act of 
1964,18 the Bail Reform Act of 1966,19 and state statutes designed 
to implement the constitutional mandate of court decisions. Even 
the law schools now recognize that criminal procedure is a subject 
worthy of being taught. 
The judicial philosophy expressed in these attempts to make the 
rich and the poor substantially equal before our criminal courts, to 
provide roughly equivalent basic rights in state and federal courts, 
and to supply the necessary implementation of constitutional rights 
which had previously existed only on paper did not spring from the 
head of Zeus one morning. There had been significant beginnings 
before Earl Warren became Chief Justice. 
The federal courts had enforced an exclusionary rule in search 
and seizure cases for almost forty years;20 they had also barred the 
admission of evidence obtained as a result of illegal wiretapping21 
and confessions· obtained during a period of unnecessary delay be-
tween arrest and presentment before a commissioner.22 The Supreme 
Court had developed a substantial body of precedent in the field of 
search and seizure during the preceding thirty years.23 It had already 
17. See LaFave &: Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making 
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. R.Ev. 987 (1965). 
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3006a (1964). See Kutak, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 44 NEB. 
L. REV. 703 (1965). 
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (Supp. II, 1966); see Wald & Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 
1966: A Practitioner's Primer, 52 A.B.A.J. 940 (1966). 
20. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
21. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
22. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
23. Consent searches: Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). Scope of search 
incident to an arrest: United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United 
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart 
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 
20 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Items subject to seizure: United 
States v. Lefkowitz, supra; Manon v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927): Gouled v. 
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determined that the fourth amendment's prohibition against un-
reasonable searches-but not the federal exclusionary rule-applied 
to the states through incorporation in the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.24 Lawyers had routinely been provided to 
indigent defendants in the federal courts since 1937.25 The Court 
had for almost twenty years reviewed state criminal convictions in-
volving the voluntariness of confessions.26 In the year before the 
appointment of Chief Justice Warren, the Court had reversed a 
state conviction on the grounds that the conduct of police officers 
"shocked its conscience," "offended its sense of justice," and "ran 
counter to the decency of civilized conduct."27 
Justice Black had for some time urged that the Bill of Rights 
should be applied to the states in toto through incorporation within 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.28 But the argu-
ments for blanket incorporation were not accepted by the Court, 
and the protections of the fifth and sixth amendments had not thus 
far been accepted as fit subjects for selective incorporation. In gen-
eral, the Court concerned itself primarily with federal criminal 
cases; review of state criminal judgments was limited to a small 
group of cases each year, the most important of which frequently 
involved the admission of confessions29 or the question of whether a 
defendant had been seriously disadvantaged by denial of counsel.30 
In every year but one, the number of federal criminal cases greatly 
exceeded the number of cases reviewed from state courts,31 and this 
situation was not reversed until 1961.32 
It may be forcefully argued that the increased concern of the 
United States, supra. Premises protected and abandonment: Hester v. United States, 
265 U.S. 57 (1924). Search of moving automobiles: Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160 (1949); Carroll v. Unite~. States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Probable cause to arrest 
without a warrant: Brinegar v. United States, supra; McDonald v. United States, 335 
U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Fruit of the poison tree: 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
24. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937). 
25. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
26. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948). 
27. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
28. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (dissenting opinion). 
29. E.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); 
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. 
Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v. 
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
30. E.g., Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 
(1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Foster v. Illinoi~. 332 U.S, 134 (1947); Betts 
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
31. The cases reviewed arc cataloged in the tables contained in the annual reviews 
of the work of the Supreme Court in the Harvard Law Review. 
32. Id. 
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Supreme Court in matters of criminal justice was almost inevitable. 
A -Court which had divested itself of the function of czar in the field 
of economic regulation on the eve of World War II predictably 
would in the postwar era assume a greater role in protecting indi-
vidual rights of minority group members, political dissidents, and 
persons accused of crime.33 The vacuum created by abdication of a 
function which had occupied much of the Court's time for several 
decades called for a new sense of direction, and few areas were of 
greater national significance than the eradication of the social and 
political inequalities which seemed to be the hallmarks of the real 
American dilemma. 
The Court's concern with criminal procedure can be understood 
only in the context of the struggle for civil rights. Professor 
McCloskey has observed that the Warren Court's "espousal of civil 
rights was less a matter of deliberate choice than of a predictable 
response to the wave of history."34 Concern with civil rights almost 
inevitably required attention to the rights of defendants in criminal 
cases. It is hard to conceive of a Court that would accept the chal-
lenge of guaranteeing the rights of Negroes and other disadvantaged 
groups to equality before the law and at the same time do nothing to 
ameliorate the invidious discrimination between rich and poor 
which existed in the criminal process. It would have been equally 
anomalous for such a Court to ignore the clear evidence that mem-
bers of disadvantaged groups generally bore the brunt of most un-
lawful police activity. 
If the Court's espousal of equality before the law was to be 
credible, it required not only that the poor Negro be permitted to 
vote and to -attend a school with whites, but also that he and other 
disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as well as possess, the 
same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime. It required 
that the values expressed in the Bill of Rights have meaning to the 
vast majority of om citizens whose contact with the criminal process 
is limited to local police and local judges, and for whom protections 
in a federal criminal trial are only slightly more relevant than the 
criminal procedure of Afghanistan. The principles of the Bill of 
Rights had to be applied to modern police, prosecutorial, and judi-
cial practices if they were to retain their vitality in a modern age. 
The issue posed to the Warren Court was not whether it would 
33. R. McCLoSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME CouRT 181 (1960); Mason, Understand-
ing the Warren Court: Judicial Review and Judicial Self-Restraint, 81 PoL, ScI. Q. 523, 
549-50 (1966). 
34. R. McCLOSKEY, supra note 3.3, at 226. 
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deal with the problems of inequality, illusory rights, and disparity 
in basic protections, but how far it would go in requiring changes 
and what priorities it would give to reform of the criminal process 
in the hierarchy of social and political problems which faced the 
nation. It could not be unmindful that any significant changes 
would trigger one or more of a traditional set of adjurations which 
assert that devotion to the principles of federalism requires that the 
states should have the widest latitude in the administration of their 
own systems of criminal justice; that the Court should not legislate 
(at least in matters of personal rights) but should interpret the Con-
stitution to mean exactly what the Founding Fathers intended, re-
gardless of changes in the social, political, or economic life of the 
nation; that it should be careful not to take any action that might 
impair the capacity of law· enforcement agencies to deal with the 
problem of increasing crime which threatens the law-abiding citizens 
of the country; and that it should not seek to lead or educate the 
people concerning basic values of the American civilization, for these 
are the tasks entrusted to other branches of government. Perhaps, 
most important, the Court could not ignore the teaching of history 
that its prestige and independence is placed in jeopardy when it goes 
too far, too fast, for the mainstream of the public or its representa-
tives in Congress.85 
But the temper of the times provided strong reasons for the 
Supreme Court of the sixties to foresake the passivity advocated by 
Justice Frankfurter in favor of a more activist course. The danger of 
surging too far ahead of public or congressional opinion had to be 
balanced against the danger that too much restraint might make the 
legal process irrelevant to the pressing social needs of the day. If we 
are to persuade dissidents to stay within the system and out of the 
streets, we must have courts which are responsive to changing social 
values and which have the capacity to provide redress for basic 
grievances. It is to the credit of the Supreme Court that it recognized 
that the nation was in the midst of a social revolution before this 
became apparent to most of the elected representatives of the people, 
and that it sought to eliminate the basic defects in our system for 
the administration of criminal justice within our present structure. 
The result of this perceptive approach has been to immunize the 
Court from much of the alienation expressed against other institu-
tions of our society not only by the disadvantaged, but also by large 
35. Id. at 227; see A. MAsoN, THE SUPREME CoUR.T FROM TAFT TO WAIUlEN 282 (2d 
ed. 1968). 
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numbers of our youth,36 upon whom the future of the nation 
depends. 
Despite persuasive arguments urging different action,37 the prin-
ciples of federalism have yielded to the desire of the Court to provide 
equal justice to the rich and the poor in state and federal criminal 
proceedings. The notion of a national concept of basic justice does 
not seem too radical for America a century after the Civil War. It is 
not surprising that the majority of the Court has accepted the argu-
ment that the genius of federalism does not require that states be 
permitted to experiment with the fundamental rights of defendants 
in criminal cases any more than it permts experimentation with first 
amendment freedoms. The mere status of being in America should 
confer protection broad enough to protect any man from the 
vagaries of a state which by inertia or design fails to keep pace with 
a national consensus concerning the fund<1-mental rights of the indi-
vidual in our society.38 
The greatest strides forward have been in the implementation of 
constitutional rights which have existed only in theory in the past. 
The decisions with the greatest significance are clearly the right-to-
counsel cases.39 With a lawyer present in criminal proceedings there 
is substantial assurance of justice; without one most other proce-
dural rights are meaningless. The game is quite different when each 
side has a goalie. The sixth amendment has real vitality when an 
indigent who is unable to retain counsel is provided a lawyer to 
plead his case. The fourth amendment's protection against unre.a.son-
able searches and seizures means something when it is reinforced .by 
the exclusionary rule.40 The fifth amendment has content when it 
provides protection in a police station41 and prevents a prosecutor 
from urging that a jury draw inferences of guilt from the defen-
36. w. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSPECTIVE OF PounCAL SCIENCE 33-49 
(1967). 
37. Eloquent opposition to the Court's approach to federalism and the Bill of 
Rights has been expressed by Judge Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965), and by Justice Harlan in his dissenting 
opinions and several speeches. E.g., Harlan, Address at American Bar Center, Aug. 13, 
1963; Harlan, The Bill of Rights and the Constitution, Aug. 9, 1964, quoted in A. 
MASON, supra note 35, at 258. 
38. A. NoRm, THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL PoLmcs 179 
(1966). 
39. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963). See Kamisar &: Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Find-
ings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1963). See also Mempa v. 
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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dant's silence in the courtroom.42 Observance of procedural safe-
guards in trial courts is rendered more likely when the rights to 
appeal48 and counsel44 are available to the poor. The probability 
that constitutional rights will be respected in unsympathetic state 
courts becomes more like1 y when collateral attack on state court 
judgments is permitted within the federal judicial system.45 
The results of the decisions of the Warren Court can be seen by 
examining the differences in the way our hypothetical yoke robbery 
case would be conducted today. The Court's prohibition against a 
lineup in the absence of counsel (or adequate safeguards sufficient 
to render the lineup "a less-than-critical" stage of the proceedings) 
might be violated by the police. But, violation of the defendant's 
right to counsel at this stage would render the in-court identification 
of the defendant inadmissible if the identification was tainted by 
the lineup. At the very least, it would mean the loss of the testimony 
concerning the alleged victim's prior identification at the lineup.46 
The confession obtained without informing the witness of his rights 
or permitting him an -opportunity to exercise them would be inad-
missible,47 although disputes over whether a warning was given, and, 
if so, whether there had been a valid waiver still require the resolu-
tion of credibility conflicts between the police and the accused. The 
evidence obtained from the person of the accused following his un-
lawful arrest ·would be inadmissible.48 It is doubtful that he would 
be required to admit possession as a prerequisite to a motion to 
suppress.49 In many states the defendant will be able to obtain ap-
pointed counsel at a preliminary hearing,50 and in a number of juris-
42. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
43. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956). 
44. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 294 
(1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
45. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). See 
Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. 
R.Ev. 286 (1966). 
46. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967). 
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
48. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
49. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 
755,290 P.2d 855 (1955); Weeks, Standing To Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 
6 ARIZ. L. REv. 65 (1964); Note, Standing To Object to an Unreasonable Search and 
Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 342 (1967); Comment, Standing To Object to an Unlawful 
Search and Seizure, 1965 WASH. U. L.Q. 488. 
50. "At least sixteen states usually appoint counsel at or before the preliminary 
hearing." AMERICAN BAll AssoCIATION, ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON PROSECUTION AND DE-
FENSE FUNCTIONS, AMERICA.>J BAll AssoCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL Jurna: STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 45 (1967). 
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dictions there are now bail reform acts enabling an impecunious 
defendant to obtain his pretrial liberty.51 
Criminal discovery before trial is still quite narrow,152 and the 
defendant's right to obtain prior inconsistent statements of a gov-
ernment witness who testifies at the trial is not generally recog-
nized.53 However, the suppression of evidence favorable to an 
accused by the prosecutor is subject to constitutional attack.114 In 
some jurisdictions, substantial limitations have been placed upon 
cross-examination of character witnesses155 and the use of prior con-
victions to impeach.156 The prosecutor may no longer comment on 
the accused's failure to take the stand.157 A poor man convicted of a 
crime may appeal in any case where an appeal is permissible for the 
more affluent defendant, 118 and counsel will be provided for him at 
least in a first appeal.ri9 Strict adherence to constitutional principles 
is being enforced through the federal writ of habeas corpus as well as 
by direct review by the Supreme Court.60 
The results of these changes are being felt in more and longer 
trials. Although there appears to have been no drastic change in the 
percentage of acquittals, there are undoubtedly acquittals or deci-
sions not to prosecute in some cases which would have resulted in 
convictions in 1953. There may be some cases where compliance 
with the standards of conduct required of the police have resulted in 
unsolved cases which could have been solved by an illegal search or 
51. See BAIL AND SUMMONS, 1965 PROCEEDINGS: INSTITUTE ON THE OPERATION OF 
PRETRIAL Rfil.EAsE PROJEC'IS; AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION ADvis::;.;..y COMMUTEE ON hE· 
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJEcr -!:IN MINDWM STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 4 (J.968), 
52. Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE L.J. 
477 (1964); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal 
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1276 (1966); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal 
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. I,,, REv. 228 (1964); Bibliography: Criminal Discovery, 5 TUISA L.J. 
207 (1968). 
53. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964); Note, The 
Jencks Right: Judidal and Legislative Modifications, the States and the Future, 50 
VA. L. REV. 535 (1964). 
54. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
55. See, e.g., Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The subsequent 
nistory of Luck is discussed in Circuit Note, Criminal Law and Procedure, 56 
GEO. L.J. 5!3, 116·28 (1967). 
56. Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Shimon v. United States, 
352 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
57. Griflin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
58. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Griflin v. lliinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956). 
59. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 294 
(1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
60. 'Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
December 1968] Criminal Procedure 261 
a compelled waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. We 
really do not know how much effect the Court decisions have had. 
The one certainty is that the quality of our system of justice is much 
improved. 
This rapid transition to a real adversary system in the criminal 
trial has occasioned widespread opposition. Few people continue to 
assert that the Court decisions have caused crime, but there is a vocal 
lobby which asserts that the decisions have unreasonably limited the 
police in their effort to apprehend criminals and solve crimes. 
The first general outcry was occasioned by the Mallory61 decision 
in 1957, in which the Court, speaking through Justice Frank-
furter, did little more than reiterate the position'. which it had taken 
fourteen years earlier in McNabb: 62 that in a federal prosecution a 
statement obtained during a period of unnecessary delay between 
arrest and presentment before a commissioner was inadmissible. The 
opinion triggered a legislative furor in Congress, but the bill which 
would have overruled the holding in the case failed to pass.63 No 
other bill obtained the requisite support until 1967 when the Con-
gress modified the 1"\Iallory rule in the District of Columbia by the 
passage of the so-called Three-Hour Bill.64 Last summer, both the 
legislation enacted the previous year for the District of Columbia 
and the stricter Mallory rule still applicable to federal courts out-
side of the District were modified by the provisions of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act which provided that no state-
ment should be inadmissible "solely because of delay ... if such con-
fession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily 
and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if 
such confession was made or given by such person within six hours 
immediately following ij~s arrest .... " 65 
61. Mallory v. United States, !154 U.S. 449 (1957). 
62. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. !!!12 (194!!). 
63. The history of the congressional fight over Mallory in the 85th Congress is 
detailed in Hogan &: Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 
47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958). 
64. Title III of Public Law 90-226, 81 Stat. 7!14, (1967) provides: 
Sec. !!Ol(a} Any person arrested in the District of Columbia may be questioned 
with respect to any matter for a period not to exceed three hours immediately 
following his ,arrest. Such person shall be advised of and accorded his rights under 
applicable law respecting any such interrogation. In the case of any such arrested 
person who is released without being charged with a crime, his detention shall not 
be recorded as an arrest in any official record. 
(b} Any statement, admission, or confession made by an arrested person within 
three hours immediately following his arrest shall not be excluded from evidence 
in the courts of the District of Columbia solely because of delay in presentment. 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (Supp. IV, 1968). The statute also provides that the time 
limitation contained in the statute should not apply to cases where a longer period of 
delay is reasonable in view of the means of available transportation and the distance 
required to be travelled. 
262 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:249 
The second major outcry resulted from the Mapp case in 1961,66 
in which the exclusionary rule was applied to evidence obtained in 
violation of the fourth amendment by state law enforcement officers. 
The police opposition to Mapp was in sharp contrast to the reception 
of its predecessor, Wolf v. Colorado, 67 which had applied the fourth 
amendment to the states fourteen years earlier. It seems quite clear 
that many police departments deliberately ignored the requirements 
of the fourth amendment during the period between Wolf and 
Mapp. Several post-Mapp cases applying the fourth amendment to 
arrests without a warrant68 and to the adequacy of an affidavit sub-
mitted in support of a warrant69 followed, but these cases were ac-
companied by other decisions which dealt sympathetically with 
bona fide attempts at compliance70 and which declined to apply all 
of the rigors of the federal rules of search and seizure, to the states.71 
It appears that most police forces are 1earning to live with the results. 
The case which seemed to galvanize opposition into a potent 
political force was the Miranda decision72 in 1966. The Chief Justice, 
speaking for a divided Court, laid down the basic requirements 
which must be met before an admissible confession can be ob-
tained from a defendant.73 With little empirical data to back up 
their contentions, critics asserted that many crimes could not be 
solved without confessions, and that warnings of rights or provision 
of counsel would preclude most defendants from confessing. The 
limited empirical research which has been done since the opinion 
casts substantial doubt upon these conclusions,74 but confessions had 
66. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. 
67. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
68. E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). 
69. E.g., Riggan v. Virginia, 384 U.S. 152 (1966); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964). 
70. E.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). 
71. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), en-
gendered vigorous criticism, but it was tempered by the hope of some critics that the 
case would be limited to its facts and not extended as the Court ultimately chose to 
do in Miranda. See Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interroga-
tion, 25 Omo ST. L.J. 449 (1964); Enker &: Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. 
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 :'.\fINN. L. REv. 47 (1964). 
73. To comply with the opinion, the police are required to inform a suspect in a 
custodial interrogation that he has a right to remain silent, that anything that he says 
can and will be used against him, that he has the right to the advice and presence of 
a lawyer, and that a lawyer will be provided for him if he is unable to afford one. 384 
U.S. at 467-73. See Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Com-
ments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. 
L. REv. 59 (1966); Symposium, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views 
on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 169 (1966). 
74. Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, Custodial Interrogation" in Our Nation's Capital: 
The Attempt To Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347 (1968); Robinson, Po-
lice and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to Interrogation as Revealed 
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so long been a vital tool of police investigative technique that asser-
tions of reduced efficiency accompanied by a rise in the crime rate 
were apparently enough to persuade many people that the Court 
had gone too far in protecting individual rights.715 Most critics of the 
opinion did not deny that the inherent coerciveness of a police sta-
tion was in reality a compulsion exercised against a defendant's 
right to remain silent. Yet it was argued that the need for confes-
sions was so great that this coerciveness should be overlooked as long 
as it did not go too far in the direction of forcing a statement from 
unwilling lips.76 In addition, the legitimacy of the decision was ques-
tioned with contentions that the fifth amendment had never been 
intended to apply in a police station.77 
by Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity To Comply, 
1968 DuKE L.J. 425; Seeburger &: Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 
29 U. P1rr. L. R.Ev. 1 (1967); Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of 
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). 
75. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee states the argument forcefully: 
The Committee is of the view that it simply makes no sense to exclude from 
a jury what has traditionally been considered the very highest type of evidence, 
and the most convincing evidence of guilt, that is, a ·voluntary confession or 
incriminating statement by the accused. This view is borne out by common ex-
perience and general acceptation, and by almost 200 years of precedent in the 
courts of this country. 
The Committee also feels that the majority opinion not only runs counter 
to practically all the precedent in the State and Federal courts, but that it 
misconstrues the Constitution. The Committee alines itself wholeheartedly with 
the view cxpres~ed by the dissenting Justices and with what it feels are the 
views of the vast majority of judges, lawyers and plain citizens of our country 
who are so obviously aroused a, the unrealistic opinions such as the Miranda 
decision which are having the effect of daily releasing upon the public vicious 
criminals w;10 have voluntarily confessed their guilt. 
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &: An. N. 1634, 
1658-59. 
76. See the dissent of Justice Harlan in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515 (1966): 
Without at all subscribing to the generally black picture of police conduct 
painted by the Court, I think it must be frankly recognized at. the outset that 
police questioning allowable ·under due process precedents may inherently entail 
some pressure on the suspect and may seek advantage in his ignorance or weak-
nesses. The atmosphere and questioning techniques, proper and fair though 
they be, can in themsehes e.xert a tug on the suspect to confe.,s, and in this light 
"[t]o speak of any confessions of crime made after arrest as being 'voluntary' 
or 'uncoerced' is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional ...• " ... Until today 
the role of the Constitution has been only to sift out undue pressure, not to 
assure spontaneous confessions. 
St:e also Bator &: Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to 
Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 62 
(1966). 
77. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee called the decision "an ab-
rupt departure from precedent extending back at least to the earliest days of the 
Republic." S. REP. No. 109i, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), 1968 U.S. CODE Co:-.G. &: An. 
N. 1634, 1656. Justice White, while agreeing that the application of the fifth 
amendment to the police station was novel, and disagreeing with . its wisdom, did 
not question the validity of the process by which the decision was reached: 
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly sug-
gested by the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at odds with American and 
English legal history, and involves a departure from a long line of precedent 
does not prove either that the Coun has e.xceeded its powers or that the Coun 
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Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held that a police lineup is 
normally such a critical stage in a criminal proceeding that the de-
fendant, absent waiver, must be represented by counsel-at least if 
the police department did not take steps which would "eliminate 
the risk of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings 
and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial . , . .''78 
The possibility of excluding eyewitness testimony again sounded the 
clarion for opponents of the Court's reform movement in criminal 
procedure. Their views gained ascendancy in the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which provides that a confes-
sion shall be admissible in a federal court if it is voluntarily given. 
In this regard, the Act specifically states that the failure to advise 
a defendant that he was not required to make any statement or that 
he had a right to the assistance of counsel "need not be conclusive on 
the issue of the voluntariness of the confession."70 In addition, the 
Act provides that the testimony of eyewitnesses "shall be admissible 
in evidence,"80 presumably intending that such testimony shall be 
admissible even if it results from a lineup held in violation of the 
mandate of the Wade opinion. 
The provisions of the new Act, of course, do not apply to state 
prosecutions where the 1\1 iranda and Wade cases remain in full 
effect. But the assertion of the power to overrule the Supreme Court 
on the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the fifth and 
sixth amendments raises a potential conflict between the branches 
of the government which is yet to be resolved.81 It is difficult to see 
is wrong or unwise in its present reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment. It 
does, however, underscore the obvious--that the Court has not discovered or 
found the law in making today's decision, nor has it derived it from some ir-
refutable sources: what it has done is to make new law and new public policy 
in much the same way that it has done in the course of interpreting other great 
clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court historically has done. Indeed, 
it is what it must do and will continue to do until and unless there is some 
fundamental change in the constitutional distribution of governmental powers. 
384 U.S. at 531. 
78. United States v. Wade, 388 _l.J.S. 218, 239 (1967). See Comment, Right to Coun-
sel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in Effectit-e Implementation of 
an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 65 (1967); Comment, Lawyers and 
Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967). 
79. 18 U.S.C. § 350l(a)-(b) (Supp. IV, 1968). 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (Supp. IV, 1968). 
81. One possibility of avoiding the conflict would be the acceptance of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee's argument that the provisions of the new Act simply constitute 
an acceptance of the invitation to Congress contained in the Court's opinion where-
in it encouraged Congress and the states to "exercise their creative rule-making 
capacities" to develop "effective ways of protecting the rights of the indiYidual 
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws" [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 467 (1964)]. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess._50 (1968), 1968 U.S. CoDl: 
Co:-G. & AD. N. 1634, 1659. The short answe::: to the argument is that the report as 
a whole makes it clear that the Senate Committee was attempting to overrule the 
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how the provisions of the new Act which in substance overrule 
Miranda and Wade in the federal courts can be upheld, unless the 
Court chooses to retreat from its holdings or finds some techniqu_e 
of statutory construction which would permit it to avoid the ap-
parent conflict. 
Perhaps more significant than what Congress did is what some 
Senators proposed that it should do. As reported from the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, the crime control bill would have denied lower 
federal courts jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state 
court criminal judgments even if a defendant's constitutional rights 
had been abridged. The bill would also have deprived both the lower 
federal courts and the Supreme Court of the power to review the 
voluntariness of a confession admitted in a state criminal trial if the 
highest court of the state had found the confession voluntary.82 
Fortunately, these provisions attempting to limit the power of the 
federal judiciary to require compliance with the Constitution were 
deleted from the bill before its passage. However, the threat of im-
pairing judicial independence through the limitation of jurisdiction 
5till remains, and the Senate Judiciary Committee's report leaves 
little doubt that the threat of such jurisdictional restrictions was 
intended to be a gloved fist designed to keep the Supreme Court in 
line.83 
RarP.ly do the opponents of the Warren Court give credit to the 
Court for changes which have helped law enforcement agents in 
their attempts to solve crime and apprehend criminals. The Court 
overturned a long line of precedents to permit the seizure of non-
testimonial evidentiary material;8~ rejected contentions that the 
police should not be able to use informers;85 and has generally al-
lowed the police to cop.~eal the identity of informers before trial.86 
More recently, it has permitted a stop and frisk where a police officer 
"observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and 
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous .... "87 Cases holding that the fourth amendment applies 
decision, not implement it. Furthermore, the statute does not provide alternative 
ways of protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. 
82. S. 917, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
83. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90lh Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. 
S: AD. N. 1634, 1660-75. 
84. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
85. Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231 (1967); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206 (1966). 
86. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
81. ·1·cI"') -.. Ohio, 392 TJ.S. I (1968). 
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to electronic eavesdropping also make it clear that a statute with 
appropriate safeguards would meet constitutional muster.BB The 
same realism that the Court has demonstrated in cases involving the 
implementation of defendants' rights has been evident in the Court's 
attitude toward effective law enforcement needs. 
The most important question is whether the Court will continue 
along the paths which it has chosen to follow during recent years; 
whether it will engage in a holding operation until experience and 
education develop the necessary public and congressional climate for 
acceptance of further reforms; or whether the Court, influenced by 
the rising crime rate and the more general disrespect for law reflected 
in university and urban disturbances, will retreat from the positions 
advanced in its most controversial decisions. It is possible to specu-
late about the future, but the list of imponderables cautions against 
predictions. Some would argue that the Court's justifiable concern 
over judicial independence and supremacy requires self-restraint 
when the public reaction to the Court's decisions reveals that it is 
either too far behind or too far ahead of a national consensus. In this 
modern era, some even suggest that discretion requires the Court to 
follow the polls as well as the election returns.B9 Suc;h analyses sug-
gest the wisdom of a period of comparative passivity in which to ac-
commodate law enforcement officials to the new rules with the aid 
of newly available federal financing. During such a period the Court 
would seek to interpret and enforce compliance with its existing 
decisions. For instance, it could provide additional guidance con-
cerning what constitutes "custodial interrogation" or "waiver" 
within the meaning of Miranda and elaborate on the constitutional 
requirements for permissible electronic surveillance. However, the 
Court might refrain from deciding such volatile questions as what 
constitutes the outer limit of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine; whether counsel must be provided in misdemeanor cases and 
at preliminary hearings; whether· most of our vagrancy and dis-
orderly conduct statutes are constitutional; whether the denial of 
bail can be predicated upon dangerousness; whether the police have 
the right to stop and interrogate a person thought to be a suspect 
but known to be unarmed where there is no immediate danger of a 
crime being committed; whether the fourth, fifth, and eighth amend-
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 
(1967). See Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATHOUC U. L. REv. 
296 (1968); Blakey & Hancock, A Proposed Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 43 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 657 (1968). 
89. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1968, at 19, col. 1. 
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ments have the same mear.:11g in urban riot situations as in routine 
criminal investigation~ and prosecutions; whether our system of 
plea bargaining with its built-in "differential leniency" is consistent 
with due process; and whether basic fairness requires a change in 
the scope of discovery in criminal cases. To some, such a period of 
passivity would indicate prudence. To others, valor is the better part 
of discretion, and they would contend that such an approach of 
"ducking the hard ones" would be an abdication of judicial responsi-
bility. 
The outlook of the man ·who replaces Earl Warren will be a sig-
nificant element in the judicial equation. But history teaches us to 
avoid inferences of probable judicial performance on the Supreme 
Court from past experience in other capacities. It may be appropri-
ate to remember that fifteen years ago one respected periodical sug-
gested that Earl Warren was antiiabor and questioned whether he 
harbored biased racial views;90 another commentator predicted that 
he was a middle-of-the-roader who would "hold his helm to the 
center";91 a third doubted his ability to provide strong leadership 
for the Court.92 Proponents of the status quo must have gained heart 
by the Chief Justice's vote in Iroine93 in the 1953 term, had doubts 
by the time he dissented in Grunewald,94 Groban,95 and Briethaupt96 
in the 1956 term, and seen the handwriting on the wall when the 
"gathering storm"97 of the 1958 term produced the dissents in 
Cicenia,98 Crooker,99 Palermo,100 Pittsburgh Plate Glass,1°1 Abbate,102 
and Bartkus.108 
It seems doubtful that any substantial long-term retreats will be 
taken from positions already assumed by the Court. Fortunately, the 
history of civil liberties in this country has been one of growth; there 
90. 177 NATION 282-84 (19!13). 
91. Frank, Affirmative Opinion on Justice Warren, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 3, 
1954, at 17. 
92. Gressman, The Coming Trials of Justice Warren, 129 NEW REPUBLIC 8·10 (1953); 
What's Ahead for the Supreme Court, 35 U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REl?ORT 36·38 (1953). 
93. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
94. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
95. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). 
96. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). 
97. The phrase is that of Professor Kamisar. Kamisar, Equal Justice in the 
Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
OUR TIME 38 (1965). 
98. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958). 
99. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). 
100. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). 
101. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). 
102. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
103. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
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have been temporary interruptions, but progress has been general. 
Experience has shown that law enforcement agencies can accommo-
date themselves to new rules by changing their techniques. They 
are learning to solve crimes without physical torture or psychological 
coercion. They will learn to solve them without violating the fourth 
or fifth amendments. Their task will be made easier by the belated 
recognition that federal funds are needed to help provide better 
selection procedures, training, organization, and equipment. The 
states survived federal judicial protection of freedom of religion and 
freedom of speech. They will survive federal protection of the rights 
of defendants in criminal cases. 
With the passage of time and the constantly increasing influence 
of the post-World War II generation, a broad-er understanding will 
develop of what the Court has been trying to accomplish. A hundred 
years from now lawyers will not be amazed by the changes wrought 
by the Warren Court. They will wonder how it could have been 
otherwise in the America of the sixties. 
